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FINANCIAL COMPENSATION AND APOLOGIES 2 
Abstract 
Previous studies have shown that when a recipient suffers from financial harm, allocators can 
use repair strategies that address financial or relational interests to promote relationship 
repair. Research to date, however, has neglected to study the effects of financial and relational 
strategies on relationship preservation simultaneously. In the present contribution, we 
examine this question. Based on the equality norm, we hypothesized that a financial 
compensation that fails to redress the harm suffered by the recipient (i.e., undercompensation) 
will be less effective in preserving a relationship than a financial compensation that do redress 
it (i.e., equal compensation and overcompensation). Moreover, we expected that relational 
strategies (i.e., apologies) would promote relationship preservation in contexts where the 
financial compensation alone is insufficient to redress the harm to the recipient, thus in cases 
of undercompensation. The results of a pilot study and a lab experiment using the dictator 
game confirmed our hypotheses. Consequently, our studies demonstrate that even in purely 
economic settings, relational strategies (i.e., apologies) can facilitate relationship preservation 
over and above financial strategies (i.e., financial compensation).  
Keywords: financial compensation; apology; equality norm; relationship preservation; dictator 
game 
JEL Classification: D23 - Organizational Behavior 
PsycINFO Classification: 3000 - Social Psychology; 3020 - Group & Interpersonal Processes 
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1. Introduction 
In economic situations in which monetary resources have to be allocated between two 
or more parties, most people prefer allocations to be divided fairly (Camerer & Thaler, 1995; 
Handgraaf, Van Dijk, & De Cremer, 2003; Pillutla & Murnighan, 1996). One allocation norm 
that is particularly favored in this context is the equality norm (Handgraaf et al., 2003; 
Messick, 1993; Samuelson & Allison, 1994). The equality norm is a social standard that 
dictates an equal allocation of the resources between all the members of some specified group 
(Deutsch, 1975; Kahn, 1972; Lerner, 1975; Leventhal, 1976; Sampson, 1969, 1975). 
According to Straub and Murnighan (1995), these 50-50 offers are regarded as ―perfectly 
fair‖, because they satisfy most, if not all, criteria for fairness (see Allison & Messick, 1990; 
also see Pillutla & Murnighan, 1996). Consequently, allocations that meet the equality norm 
are associated with a range of positive consequences, such as trust (e.g., De Cremer, 2010; 
Desmet, De Cremer, & Van Dijk, 2011) and cooperation (e.g., Bottom, Daniels, Gibson, & 
Murnighan, 2002). Offers that violate the equality norm, however, are often perceived as 
unfair, and consequently may evoke a host of negative reactions, like negative emotions (e.g., 
anger, disappointment, sadness, and wounded pride; see Fehr & Baldwin, 1996; Jones & 
Burdette, 1994; Joskowicz-Jabloner & Leiser, 2011; Pillutla & Murnighan, 1996) and 
behaviors (e.g., verbal aggression; see Haden & Hojjat, 2006; Ochs & Roth, 1989). One of the 
most important consequences of such violations is that trust in the allocating party decreases 
(Bottom et al., 2002; Bottom, Eavey, & Miller, 1996; De Cremer, 2010; Kim, Ferrin, Cooper, 
& Dirks, 2004; Schweitzer, Hershey, & Bradlow, 2006). Moreover, following interpersonal 
transgressions, victims often experience some motivation to seek revenge or to avoid the 
transgressor (i.e., transgression-related interpersonal motivations or TRIMs, see McCullough, 
Bellah, Kilpatrick, & Johnson, 2001; McCullough, Fincham, & Tsang, 2003; McCullough & 
Hoyt, 2002; McCullough, Root, & Cohen, 2006). Hence, violations of the equality norm may 
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FINANCIAL COMPENSATION AND APOLOGIES 4 
threaten the continuation of the relationship between the allocator and the recipient, thus 
potentially denying them the economic benefits of future cooperation. 
For this reason, it is important that the allocator reduces negative reactions and 
promotes the continuation of the relationship after unfair resource allocations. In this respect, 
it is important that people also possess cognitive forgiveness mechanisms designed to change 
vengeful motivations and promote the restoration of relationships (Burnette, McCullough, 
Van Tongeren, & Davis, 2012). When victims forgive, they become less avoidant, less 
vengeful, and more benevolent towards the transgressor (McCullough et al., 2006). Previous 
studies have identified several factors that may promote forgiveness (e.g., high relationship 
value and low exploitation risk; see Burnette et al., 2012). Particularly interesting, however, 
are positive actions that transgressors can employ to promote forgiveness (see Jones & Davis, 
1965; McCullough, 2000; McCullough, Rachal, Sandage, Worthington, Brown, & Hight, 
1998; Ristovski & Wertheim, 2005; Tabak, McCullough, Luna, Bono, & Berry, 2012). In the 
context of financial exchanges, one prominent response is to offer a financial compensation 
(e.g., Desmet et al., 2011). By providing financial compensation, the transgressor addresses 
his or her misbehavior by returning a portion of the resources to the recipient, thereby 
reducing or undoing the financial damage that was sustained through the transgression. 
Because concerns about the outcome dominate decisions in economic decision making 
situations (Camerer, 1995), compensating the recipient may promote the continuation of the 
relationship (De Cremer, 2010; Desmet et al., 2011). Nevertheless, some scholars have argued 
that financial compensation alone may not be sufficient to restore the relationship (e.g., see 
Okimoto & Tyler, 2007). Specifically, as unfair allocations constitute a violation of the norms 
of interpersonal trust and fairness, responses that address these relational aspects of the 
transgression may also be required (Tyler, Boeckmann, Smith, & Huo, 1997). One such 
response is to apologize for the harm. Apologies communicate that the transgressor feels 
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FINANCIAL COMPENSATION AND APOLOGIES 5 
remorse and is willing to take responsibility for maintaining the relationship (Scher & Darley, 
1997). In this way, apologies constitute a non-financial means of addressing transgressions 
(e.g., Kim, Dirks, & Cooper, 2009; Lazare, 2004) that satisfies relational concerns by 
affirming the victim‘s social standing and respect for the victim (Barclay & Skarlicki, 2008). 
So far, little research has investigated the impact of financial compensation on the 
restoration of relationships (Desmet et al., 2011; De Cremer, 2010). Moreover, hardly any 
research has addressed the relationship between financial and relational responses to fairness 
violations. In the current studies, we focus on financial compensation and apologies, and 
compare their effectiveness as a means to facilitate relationship preservation in the aftermath 
of distributive harm. When a transgression has been made and a compensation or an apology 
is offered, victims may choose to continue or discontinue their relationship with the 
transgressor; therefore, we will focus on relationship preservation as the dependent variable. 
1.1 Research aims 
In the present contribution, we aim to address two major questions. First, we aim to 
investigate the effectiveness of financial compensation as a means to preserve a relationship 
after an unfair allocation of resources. Previous research has provided some indication that 
financial compensation may be a useful way to repair relationships (Desmet et al., 2011); 
however, it is unclear how the amount of compensation may affect its effectiveness. To 
determine the conditions that are necessary for compensation to be effective, we directly 
compare the effectiveness of three levels of compensation: undercompensation (i.e., 
compensation that reduces the inequality of the allocation but fails to restore equality), equal 
compensation (i.e., compensation that returns sufficient resources to restore equality), and 
overcompensation (i.e., compensation that not only restores equality but exceeds it, resulting 
in an outcome that is more favorable to the victim than to the offender). Secondly, we 
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FINANCIAL COMPENSATION AND APOLOGIES 6 
examine when relational responses may be more effective than responses that directly address 
the financial aspects of transgressions in promoting willingness to continue the relationship 
with the transgressor. More specifically, we suggest that relational restoration responses, such 
as apologies, may be particularly helpful in preserving relationships in situations where the 
transgressors are unable or unwilling to fully compensate victims for the financial harm 
inflicted by their transgressions (i.e., in cases of undercompensation). 
1.2 Financial compensation: An economic perspective 
Financial interests dominate in decision-making situations (Camerer, 1995). 
Moreover, some scholars have argued that in economic exchanges, the continuation of a 
relationship between the parties involved is driven primarily by a concern for tangible 
outcomes (e.g., see Lewicki, Wiethoff, & Tomlinson, 2005). Consequently, financial 
compensation should facilitate the preservation of a relationship because it directly addresses 
these financial interests.  
1.2.1 Financial compensation and the equality norm 
How might the amount of compensation affect its effectiveness as a means to facilitate 
relationship preservation? To answer this question, it is important to understand that 
undercompensation, equal compensation, and overcompensation differ in two distinct 
dimensions, i.e., the outcomes that compensation provides for the victim and the extent to 
which the compensation redresses inequality. 
First, in terms of economic outcomes, greater compensation yields better outcomes for 
the victim. This suggests that to the extent that victims‘ decisions in economic decision 
making situations depend on financial interests, greater compensation will result in greater 
willingness to preserve a relationship. Indeed, in line with this argument, previous research 
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FINANCIAL COMPENSATION AND APOLOGIES 7 
has indicated that overcompensation yields better results than equal compensation and 
undercompensation (Desmet et al., 2011).  
Secondly, undercompensation, equal compensation, and overcompensation also differ 
in the extent to which they redress inequality. Undercompensation may reduce the inequality 
that results from an unfair allocation, but it fails to restore equality, and the parties‘ final 
outcomes remain unequal. In addition, while overcompensation may result in favorable 
outcomes for the recipient, it also results in inequality, as the recipient‘s final outcome 
exceeds the allocator‘s final outcome. If compensation is appreciated for the extent to which it 
redresses inequality, then the effectiveness of undercompensation and overcompensation may 
not be proportional to their economic consequences. In line with this idea, research on 
fairness has revealed that people‘s appreciation of equal and unequal outcomes may not match 
their objective monetary value (see Adams & Freedman, 1976; Berkowitz & Walster, 1976; 
De Cremer & Van Kleef, 2009; Van den Bos, Lind, Vermunt, & Wilke, 1997). Rather, the 
utility that people derive from advantageous inequality is by far exceeded by the disutility 
they derive from disadvantageous inequality (Loewenstein, Thompson, & Bazerman, 1989). 
These findings suggest that the relationship between the compensation amount and its 
effectiveness in preserving the relationship may not be linear (i.e., directly proportional to the 
recipient‘s economic outcome); rather, it may be curved so that greater compensation may 
produce less of a benefit for the relationship after the amount exceeds the equality norm.  
While predictions based on these two dimensions may differ regarding the 
effectiveness of overcompensation, both perspectives suggest that compensation that falls 
short of equality may be relatively less effective than compensation that restores equality or 
exceeds it. Nevertheless, undercompensation is attractive for transgressors, who may not be 
able or willing to sustain the considerable financial costs associated with equal compensation 
and overcompensation. A real-life example of this is the recent case of a major Belgian bank 
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FINANCIAL COMPENSATION AND APOLOGIES 8 
that compensated customers who had purchased bonds in southern European countries (an 
investment that the bank had presented as ―safe‖). Rather than offering a full compensation, 
the bank compensated its customers for the nominal amount (i.e., after deduction of costs and 
with no interests), causing them to suffer losses of at least 15% of their original investment. In 
response, many of these investors are now planning to sue the bank in order to obtain at least 
an equal compensation. Moreover, transgressions for which transgressors are unwilling to 
fully compensate are common in the context of customer service complaints, where customers 
and companies disagree about the level of service that is acceptable, and the level of 
compensation that is appropriate in this situation. For example, manufactures and customers 
may often have different perceptions of the length of the service life that is appropriate for 
appliances, with customers often expecting a longer service life than manufacturers. This 
discrepancy is particularly poignant in situations where breakages occur when the warranty 
has just expired. In this case, customers are likely to receive no or only a small compensation 
(e.g., a small discount on the purchase of a new appliance), while feeling entitled to a higher 
compensation (e.g., a free new appliance). Thus, in situations like these, customers are likely 
to feel undercompensated. As both examples illustrate, transgressors often may offer an 
undercompensation, even though by doing so it is less likely that the relationship will be 
preserved. A critical question that arises here is whether the effectiveness of 
undercompensation can be bolstered through other means. This raises the issue of non-
financial strategies. Specifically, we suggest that in situations where transgressors are 
unwilling or unable to fully compensate the financial harm inflicted by their transgressions, 
relational restoration responses, such as apologies, may help to preserve the relationship. 
1.3 Apologies: A relational perspective 
 It is increasingly acknowledged that non-financial motives are important, even in 
economic situations (Lax & Sebenius, 1986) in which people also experience relational 
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FINANCIAL COMPENSATION AND APOLOGIES 9 
concerns (Curhan, Elfenbein, & Xu, 2006; De Cremer, 2002). In this respect, unfair 
allocations do not only violate distributive fairness concerns, but also constitute a violation of 
relational fairness concerns  which reflect the degree to which people are treated with 
politeness, dignity, and respect (Bies & Moag, 1986). This notion suggests that relationship 
repair may also be facilitated by strategies that address relational harm. One prominent way in 
which transgressors can appeal to these relational concerns is by offering an apology (Lazare, 
2004; Kim et al., 2009). Darby and Schlenker (1982, p. 742) define an apology as ―an 
admission of blameworthiness and regret for an undesirable event‖.  
 Apologies address these relational fairness concerns because they convey the message 
that the transgressor admits the wrongdoing, feels remorse for it, and is willing to take 
responsibility for repairing the broken relationship (Barclay & Skarlicki, 2008; Scher & 
Darley, 1997). By doing so, apologies restore the victim‘s dignity and affirm respect for the 
victim (Barclay & Skarlicki, 2008), thereby restoring the relational aspects of fairness that 
were harmed by the transgression. A second reason why apologies address these relational 
fairness concerns is because they reduce uncertainty, which may be evoked by the 
transgression (e.g., see the uncertainty management model; Van den Bos & Lind, 2002). An 
apology signals that the transgressor will be trustworthy in the future, which leads to less fear 
and uncertainty about the transgressor‘s intentions. In the current context, this would imply 
that an apology operates as a reassurance that signals that ―everything is OK‖. 
1.3.1 Apologies and the equality norm 
 In the context of compensation, when might apologies particularly facilitate relationship 
preservation? We suggest that relational means of addressing transgressions may be 
particularly useful when compensation alone is insufficient to effectively restore the 
relationship. More specifically, we expect an interaction effect between financial 
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FINANCIAL COMPENSATION AND APOLOGIES 10 
compensation and apologies. When a financial compensation meets (i.e., in case of an equal 
compensation) or exceeds (i.e., in case of an overcompensation) the equality norm, the 
recipient‘s distributive fairness concerns are satisfied, as the initial state of disadvantageous 
inequality has been redressed. Due to the importance people adhere to fair distributions, we 
predict that a ceiling effect will occur, whereby that once unfairness has been resolved, people 
may benefit little from additional – tangible or intangible – restitutions (i.e., further financial 
compensation, such as overcompensation, or relational actions, like apologies). This implies 
that, starting from the level of equal compensation, an apology no longer has an additional 
effect on the level of relationship preservation. In case of an undercompensation, however, the 
state of disadvantageous inequality has not been redressed. Thus, as undercompensation fails 
to undo the recipient‘s unfairness, additional relational actions of the transgressor may be 
expected in order to preserve the relationship. The idea that relational strategies, such as 
apologies, may compensate for the unequal distribution of tangible outcomes received some 
initial support from the work by Brockner and Wiesenfeld (1996, see also Tata, 1999), who 
showed that relational fairness concerns (e.g., being treated fairly and with respect) are 
especially important in the context of low levels of distributive fairness. Taken together, we 
suggest that apologies may be particularly effective when fairness concerns are not met, like 
in case of an undercompensation. In this domain, we expect that receiving an apology in 
addition to a financial compensation will have a more positive effect on relationship 
preservation compared to when only a financial compensation is provided. 
1.4 The present studies 
 In the present studies, we focus on the combined effects of financial compensation and 
apologies in an economic situation. To create a fairness transgression in an economic context, 
we will use a standard dictator game (Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 1986), which implies 
that we focus on economic situations, in which outcome-related concerns are particularly 
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salient (Desmet et al., 2011). Based on the theoretical framework that we have outlined above, 
we developed the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1: (1a) Undercompensation is less effective in preserving relationships than equal 
compensation and overcompensation [under vs. equal + over], but (1b) overcompensation is 
not more effective in preserving relationships than equal compensation [equal vs. over]. 
Hypothesis 2: Undercompensation with an apology is more effective in preserving 
relationships than undercompensation without an apology [under with apology vs. under 
without apology]. 
Hypothesis 3: (3a) Equal compensation with an apology is not more effective in preserving 
relationships than equal compensation without an apology [equal with apology vs. equal 
without apology], and (3b) overcompensation with an apology is not more effective in 
preserving relationships than overcompensation without an apology [over with apology vs. 
over without apology]. 
 We present two studies to test these hypotheses. Study 1 was designed to test the first 
two hypotheses, while study 2 was designed to test all three hypotheses.  
2. Study 1: Pilot study 
2.1 Methods 
2.1.1 Participants and design 
 The participants were 22 postgraduate students (5 men, 16 women, and one person 
who did not specify a gender; Mage = 29.81, SDage = 6.53). In this study, we opted for a 
scenario study (see De Cremer, Pillutla, & Reinders Folmer, 2011, Study 1). We employed a 
four-level (undercompensation vs. undercompensation with apology vs. equal compensation 
vs. overcompensation) within-subjects design. 
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2.1.2 Procedure 
  Participants were asked to take part in a game. It was explained that they would play a 
dictator game with another student who was supposedly present in another room. First, the 
participants read a paper with instructions. They learned that in the game, two players would 
decide over the division of ten lottery tickets, with which a 10 euro gift voucher could be 
earned. One player (the allocator) would unilaterally divide the tickets; the other player (the 
recipient) could not influence this division. All participants played the role of the recipient; 
the allocator was simulated. After a pause, the experimenter brought a form on which the 
allocator supposedly had written his or her decision to allocate two of the ten tickets to the 
recipient. 
  Before continuing the game, the participants were asked to evaluate four possible 
responses by which the allocator could react to the unequal allocation: 1) by giving fewer 
extra tickets than the number needed to reach an equal distribution (i.e., one ticket in the 
undercompensation condition), 2) by giving fewer extra tickets than the number needed to 
reach an equal distribution and an additional apology (i.e., one ticket and an apology in the 
undercompensation with apology condition), 3) by giving the exact number of extra tickets 
needed to reach an equal distribution (i.e., three tickets in the equal compensation condition), 
and 4) by giving more extra tickets than needed to reach an equal distribution (i.e., five tickets 
in the overcompensation condition). After each response, we measured participants‘ 
intentions to replace the allocator (―To what extent would you wish to replace the allocator?‖; 
1 = not at all, 7 = very much), and their behavioral intentions to give the allocator a second 
chance (―Would you be willing to give the allocator a second chance in the next round?‖; 0 = 
no, 1 = yes). The four responses were presented in a fixed order. One participant did not 
answer these questions and therefore was excluded from further analyses. 
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The study was then stopped, and the participants were thanked and debriefed. 
2.2 Results 
2.2.1 Intentions to replace the allocator 
 A repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA), using the continuous measure of 
relationship preservation for the four responses as within-subject variables, revealed that the 
intention to replace the allocator was significantly affected by the allocator‘s response, F(3, 
18) = 16.16, p < .001, η² = .73. The contrasts were planned in accordance with our 
hypotheses. Supporting Hypothesis 1a, participants indicated significantly stronger intentions, 
F(1, 20) = 28.60, p < .001, η² = .59, to replace the allocator after receiving 
undercompensation with or without an apology (M = 4.69, SD = 1.50) than after receiving 
equal and overcompensation (M = 2.57, SD = 1.48). Furthermore, in support of Hypothesis 
1b, participants did not indicate stronger intentions, F(1, 20) = 0.25, n.s., η² = .01, to replace 
the allocator after receiving equal compensation (M = 2.48, SD = 1.78) compared to 
overcompensation (M = 2.67, SD = 1.65). Finally, in support of Hypothesis 2, participants had 
significantly stronger intentions, F(1, 20) = 5.99, p < .05, η² = .23, to replace the allocator 
after receiving undercompensation without an apology (M = 4.95, SD = 1.43) than after 
receiving undercompensation with an apology (M = 4.43, SD = 1.72). 
2.2.2 Behavioral intentions to give the allocator a second chance 
  A repeated measures ANOVA, using the dichotomous measure of relationship 
preservation for the four responses as within-subject variables, revealed that the behavioral 
intention to give the allocator a second chance was significantly affected by the allocator‘s 
response, F(3, 18) = 12.00, p < .001, η² = .67. Again, the contrasts were planned in 
accordance with our hypotheses. It was revealed that, in agreement with Hypothesis 1a, 
participants were significantly less likely, F(1, 20) = 29.41, p < .001, η² = .60, to give the 
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allocator a second chance after receiving undercompensation with or without an apology (M = 
0.38, SD = 0.44) than after receiving equal and overcompensation (M = 0.86, SD = 0.28). 
Further, as predicted by Hypothesis 1b, overcompensation did not increase intentions to 
preserve the relationship. Indeed, participants were even significantly less likely, F(1, 20) = 
4.71, p < .05, η² = .19, to give the allocator a second chance after receiving overcompensation 
(M = 0.76, SD = 0.44) than after receiving equal compensation (M = 0.95, SD = 0.22). Finally, 
in support of Hypothesis 2, participants were significantly less likely, F(1, 20) = 4.71, p < .05, 
η² = .19, to give the allocator a second chance after receiving undercompensation without an 
apology (M = 0.29, SD = 0.46) than after receiving undercompensation with an apology (M = 
0.48, SD = 0.51). Table 1 reports, for each of the four responses, the number and the 
percentage of participants who would (or would not) give the allocator a second chance. 
Insert Table 1 approximately here 
2.3 Discussion 
 The present study provides some initial evidence that in a financial exchange, 
apologies might encourage relationship preservation when the recipients receive a 
compensation that is too low to achieve equality. Furthermore, the results showed that 
overcompensation is not more effective than equal compensation in achieving this positive 
reaction. Both of these results thus indicate that in financial situations, it is not only monetary 
concerns that play a role. 
3. Study 2: Lab experiment 
3.1 Methods 
3.1.1 Participants and design 
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 A total of 302 undergraduate students at Erasmus University Rotterdam in the 
Netherlands (175 men, 127 women; Mage = 20.56, SDage = 1.69) participated in the study in 
exchange for course credits. Unlike study 1, study 2 was a lab experiment. Moreover, 
compensation and apologies were now manipulated orthogonally, and we included a no 
compensation condition as a control group. Therefore, the study employed a full factorial 4 
(compensation: no compensation vs. undercompensation vs. equal compensation vs. 
overcompensation) x 2 (apology: no apology vs. apology) between-subjects design.  
3.1.2 Procedure 
 Upon arrival in the laboratory, each participant was placed in a separate experimental 
cubicle in front of a computer. First, the dictator game was explained. As in study 1, all 
participants played the role of the recipient and received two of the ten lottery tickets from the 
simulated allocator. The prize was a 50 euro gift voucher. To assess their comprehension of 
the task, the participants completed three comprehension checks: 1) who would divide the ten 
lottery tickets, 2) to what extent the recipient would be able to influence the allocator's 
decision, and 3) what the lottery tickets were worth. The participants who failed to answer at 
least two of the three checks correctly were excluded from the analyses (1 participant, 0.3%). 
In addition, 12 participants (4.0%) were excluded because they voiced suspicion about the 
task.  
 To be able to examine actual relationship repair, it is necessary that participants 
experience the allocator‘s initial division of the lottery tickets as a transgression. Therefore, 
we assessed participants‘ satisfaction with the division by asking them to select one of two 
messages to send to the allocator (i.e., “I am satisfied with how you divided the lottery 
tickets” or “I am NOT satisfied with how you divided the lottery tickets”). For participants 
who indicated that they were satisfied with the division (42 participants, 14.5%), and 
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consequently did not experience it as a transgression, the experiment ended at this point. 
Participants who indicated that they were not satisfied with the division (247 participants, 
85.5%), and consequently experienced it as a transgression, proceeded to the manipulations.  
 In response to their message to the allocator, participants in the apology condition 
received an apology (“I want to apologize for the division”), while the participants in the no 
apology condition received no apology. The participants in the no compensation condition 
received no compensation, while the participants in the under-, equal, and overcompensation 
conditions received a compensation of additional tickets (“I give you – 1, 3, or 5 – extra 
ticket(s)”, respectively).  
 To measure participants‘ intentions to preserve the relationship with the allocator, we 
used six items based on the Transgression-Related Interpersonal Motivations (TRIM) 
Inventory—18 (McCullough et al., 1998). The TRIM—18 measures three dimensions of 
forgiveness motivation: avoidance, revenge, and benevolence (see McCullough et al., 2006). 
As our focus is on relationship preservation, we selected items from the benevolence subscale 
 which measures benevolence motivation towards a transgressor  and the avoidance 
subscale  which measures motivation to avoid a transgressor  that were applicable to our 
experimental situation. Four items based on the benevolence subscale were used to measure 
participants‘ intentions to continue the relationship with the transgressor: ―To what extent 
would you be likely to give the allocator a second chance?‖, ―To what extent would you be 
likely to give the allocator the benefit of the doubt?‖, ―To what extent would you be inclined 
to work with the allocator again?‖, and ―To what extent would you not mind working with the 
allocator again?‖. Two items based on the avoidance subscale were used to measure 
participants‘ intentions to discontinue the relationship with the transgressor: ―To what extent 
would you be inclined to quit working with the allocator?‖ and ―To what extent would you 
prefer to work with someone else in the future?‖. All six items were measured using seven-
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point scales (1 = not at all, 7 = very much); the two avoidance items were reverse-coded. 
Mirroring the results of McCullough et al. (2006), a factor analysis with oblique rotation 
indicated the avoidance and benevolence items to load on a single factor (eigenvalue = 3.14, 
explained variance = 52.37%); therefore, all items were combined into a single scale (alpha = 
0.79, M = 3.61, SD = 1.78) measuring relationship preservation. 
 To examine whether the apology and the compensation manipulations were 
successful, we used three manipulation checks: ―To what extent did the allocator apologize 
for his or her actions?‖, ―To what extent did the allocator say sorry about his or her actions?‖, 
and ―To what extent would you say the allocator gave you many tickets back?‖ (1 = not at all, 
7 = very much). Because scholars have argued that the use of manipulation checks may 
influence participants‘ responses on the dependent variable (Goodwin, 2009; Stangor, 2010), 
the manipulation checks were solicited at the end of the experiment, after the relationship 
preservation questionnaire. 
Finally, the experiment was stopped, and the participants were debriefed, thanked, and 
dismissed. 
3.2 Results 
3.2.1 Manipulation checks 
 Two ANOVAs revealed, for both apology manipulation checks, a significant main 
effect of apology, F(1, 239) = 24.99, p < .001, η² = 10 and F(1, 239) = 52.88, p < .001, η² = 
.18, respectively. Participants interpreted the behavior of the allocator on both items as more 
apologetic in the apology condition (M = 4.03, SD = 1.87 and M = 4.24, SD = 1.75, 
respectively) than in the no apology condition (M = 3.00, SD = 1.88 and M = 2.77, SD = 1.81, 
respectively). Further, these two ANOVAs also revealed, for both apology manipulation 
checks, a significant main effect of compensation, F(3, 239) = 37.40, p < .001, η² = .32 and 
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F(3, 239) = 24.62, p < .001, η² = .24, respectively. A post hoc test (LSD) showed that 
participants interpreted the behavior of the allocator on both items as not more apologetic 
(n.s.) in the overcompensation condition (M = 4.72, SD = 1.40 and M = 4.51, SD = 1.51, 
respectively) than in the equal compensation condition (M = 4.46, SD = 1.66 and M = 4.22, 
SD = 1.74, respectively). Further, participants interpreted the behavior of the allocator on both 
items as more apologetic (ps < .001) in the equal compensation condition than in the 
undercompensation condition (M = 2.85, SD = 1.63 and M = 2.90, SD = 1.67, respectively). 
Finally, the participants interpreted the behavior of the allocator on the first item as more 
apologetic (p < .05) and on the second item as not more apologetic (n.s.) in the 
undercompensation condition than in the no compensation condition (M = 2.25, SD = 1.78 
and M = 2.50, SD = 1.91, respectively). The fact that there is a significant main effect of the 
compensation condition on the apology manipulation checks, seems to imply that equal 
compensation and overcompensation implicitly convey the message that a transgressor feels 
sorry, and that a compensation is an expression of this regret. Consequently, in an economic 
situation, these monetary resources seem to ―make-up for‖ unfair decision-making (see 
Okimoto, 2008).  
 Finally, an ANOVA for the financial compensation manipulation check revealed 
only a significant main effect of compensation, F(3, 239) = 132.21, p < .001, η² = .62. 
Participants indicated receiving more tickets back from the allocator in the overcompensation 
condition (M = 5.58, SD = 1.15) than in the equal compensation condition (M = 4.58, SD = 
1.61), in the equal compensation condition than in the undercompensation condition (M = 
2.17, SD = 1.38), and in the undercompensation condition than in the no compensation 
condition (M = 1.61, SD = 1.00). A post hoc test (LSD) showed that the contrasts between all 
these conditions were significant (p < .001, p < .001, and p < .05, respectively). 
3.2.2 Relationship preservation 
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A 4 (compensation) x 2 (apology) ANOVA on the relationship preservation scale 
showed a significant main effect of compensation, F(3, 239) = 40.20, p < .001, η² = .34, no 
main effect of apology, F(1, 239) = .05, n.s., η² = .00, and a significant interaction effect of 
compensation and apology, F(3, 239) = 2.58, p = .05, η² = .03. Table 2 reports the means, 
standard deviations, and number of cases for each condition. 
Insert Table 2 approximately here 
 The main effect of compensation was further explored using Helmert contrasts. In 
support of Hypothesis 1a, significantly lower intentions to preserve the relationship (contrast 
estimate = -0.78, SE = 0.15, p < .001) were revealed in the undercompensation condition 
compared to the equal and overcompensation conditions (M = 4.27, SD = 0.93). In addition, in 
support of Hypothesis 1b, the intentions to preserve the relationship did not differ 
significantly (contrast estimate = 0.09, SE = 0.18, n.s.) between the equal compensation 
condition and the overcompensation condition. 
Next, we examined the significant interaction effect between compensation and 
apologies by using planned contrasts (Field, 2005). We computed four contrasts regarding the 
impact of the apology conditions within the compensation conditions. In agreement with 
Hypothesis 2, in the undercompensation condition, an apology significantly increased 
intentions to preserve the relationship, F(1, 239) = 4.06, p < .05, η² = .02. In agreement with 
Hypotheses 3a and 3b, an apology did not increase intentions to preserve the relationship in 
the equal compensation condition, F(1, 239) = 0.65, n.s., η² = .00, or the overcompensation 
condition, F(1, 239) = 3.03, n.s., η² = .01. Finally, an apology did not increase intentions to 
preserve the relationship in the no compensation condition, F(1, 239) = 0.03, n.s., η² = .00.  
 Based on our theoretical framework, we computed two contrasts regarding the impact 
of the compensation conditions within the apology conditions (i.e., a first contrast to compare 
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undercompensation with equal and overcompensation, and a second contrast to compare equal 
compensation with overcompensation). The first contrast revealed that in the no apology 
condition, undercompensation significantly decreased intentions to preserve the relationship 
compared to equal and overcompensation (M = 4.42, SD = 0.82), F(1, 239) = 30.27, p < .001, 
η² = .11. However, in the apology condition, there was no difference in intentions to preserve 
the relationship between, on the one hand, undercompensation, and on the other hand, equal 
and overcompensation (M = 4.10, SD = 1.02), F(1, 239) = 2.92, n.s., η² = .01. For the second 
contrast, there was no significant increase in intentions to preserve the relationship in the 
overcompensation condition compared to the equal compensation condition, including both 
the apology condition, F(1, 239) = 0.02, n.s., η² = .00, and the no apology condition, F(1, 239) 
= 0.64, n.s., η² = .00. These final results support our predictions in Hypotheses 1, 2, and 3.  
3.3 Discussion 
 Study 2 provides further evidence that in financial exchanges, apologies increase the 
effectiveness of undercompensation as a means to preserve a relationship. Furthermore, as 
expected, the results show that undercompensation is less effective than equal compensation, 
and equal compensation is as effective as overcompensation in preserving relationships. 
4. General discussion 
 An unfair division of available resources can lead to mistrust, disappointment, and 
anger between the parties involved, which makes forgiveness and relationship preservation 
less likely to occur (Bradfield & Aquino, 1999; McCornack & Leveni, 1990). Therefore, it is 
important to understand the mechanisms by which relationship preservation can be enhanced 
in such situations. Prior research has revealed that in interdependent situations, allocators can 
make use of repair strategies that address the recipient‘s financial interests (i.e., financial 
compensation; see Desmet et al., 2011) or strategies that address relational interests (i.e., 
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apologies; see De Cremer, 2002; Lax & Sebenius, 1986). Both strategies are thought to be 
successful because they signal that the allocator takes responsibility for the transgression and 
is trying to reduce the harm that has been performed by the transgression. This idea was 
confirmed by Bottom et al. (2002), who identified financial compensation, explanations, and 
apologies as effective strategies to enhance cooperation. Although prior research has 
suggested that financial compensation alone may not be sufficient to effectively restore the 
relationship (e.g., Curhan et al., 2006; De Cremer, 2002), the research to date has neglected to 
study if and when there is a simultaneous effect of financial compensation and apologies on 
relationship preservation. 
 The present studies had two important aims. The first aim was to investigate the 
relationship between the amount of compensation and the extent to which the relationship was 
preserved. The second aim was to demonstrate that in cases of undercompensation, non-
financial means can have an important secondary value in preserving relationships. We tested 
our hypotheses in two studies that presented a financial allocation situation. In both of these 
studies, the participants played the role of the recipient in a dictator game with a simulated 
allocator. The allocator inflicted financial harm on the recipient in the first phase of the 
experiment, that he or she then tried to minimalize or undo by offering an apology (or not) 
and/or financial compensation (or not).  
Our hypotheses were confirmed by the results. Both of our studies showed that the 
participants who received equal compensation or overcompensation had greater intentions to 
preserve the relationship than the participants who received undercompensation (Hypothesis 
1a). These results corroborate previous research that revealed that financial compensation 
encourages relationship repair, and greater compensation elicits more favorable reactions than 
lesser compensation (Desmet et al., 2011). From an economic perspective, greater 
compensation should result in higher tendencies toward relationship preservation. However, 
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both of our studies revealed that overcompensation does not increase intentions to preserve 
the relationship more than equal compensation does (Hypothesis 1b). This result corroborates 
the findings of Desmet et al. (2011), that showed similar effects of compensation size on trust 
restoration when the initial malicious intentions of the allocator were clear to the recipient.  
Further, both of our studies showed that the participants‘ intentions to preserve the 
relationship with the allocator were higher after receiving undercompensation with an apology 
than after receiving undercompensation without an apology (Hypothesis 2). From a relational 
perspective, these results confirm that in cases of undercompensation, when compensation 
alone is insufficient to reach equality, an apology offers important additional value in 
preserving relationships. In other words, in these situations, apologies constitute a non-
financial means to preserve relationships. Furthermore, the results of study 2 revealed that 
apologies did not promote relationship preservation in the context of equal compensation 
(Hypothesis 3a) or overcompensation (Hypothesis 3b). Hence, when an allocator provides the 
necessary financial means to satisfy or exceed the equality norm, there is no need for 
additional non-financial strategies to preserve the relationship. 
In the remainder of the discussion, we focus on the relative importance of financial 
and non-financial motives of the people who have to decide whether to preserve the 
relationship with a party who harmed them financially. We also discuss the relationship 
between the amount of compensation and the willingness to preserve the relationship. Finally, 
we describe in depth some limitations of the present studies. 
4.1 Financial and relational motives 
Classical economic theory assumes that people are both rational and selfish (i.e., 
maximize their own outcomes), while other motives are largely ignored (Camerer & Thaler, 
2003; Dawes & Thaler, 1988). The present studies, however, highlight that financial 
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outcomes alone may not be sufficient to understand relationship preservation. Rather, our 
findings are in line with the idea that people‘s appreciation of restoration attempts also 
depends on fairness concerns, such as fair treatment and respect (see Bies & Moag, 1986; 
Tyler & Bies, 1990). Compensation particularly resulted in greater relationship preservation if 
it restored equality, and the impact of further compensation beyond that was limited, and far 
smaller than the impact of failing to restore equality (cf. Loewenstein et al., 1989). Moreover, 
relationship preservation could further be bolstered by apologies, at least in cases of 
undercompensation. As such, the present findings are in line with research that stresses the 
importance of appealing to relational motives in order to achieve trust repair (Bottom et al., 
2002; Lazare, 2004; Kim et al., 2009). 
The provision of apologies did not universally facilitate relationship repair. Its impact 
was limited in situations where equality was met or exceeded, or when no compensation was 
given. How can these findings be understood, in light of previous research that has indicated 
that apologies alone (i.e., without financial compensation) can promote reconciliation (e.g., 
Bottom et al., 2002; Exline, Deshea, & Holeman, 2007; Ohbuchi, Kameda, & Agarie, 1989)? 
Scholars have argued that when actors enter in an economic exchange situation (like the 
dictator game), which mainly consists of resource allocations between two or more agents, 
trust is typically calculus-based (i.e., outcome-related concerns imply that broken trust can be 
repaired most effectively by financial strategies, such as a financial compensation) rather than 
identification-based (i.e., trust driven by affect and interpersonal concerns – which implies 
that broken trust can be repaired most effectively by relational strategies, such as an apology; 
see Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt, & Camerer, 1998; Lewecki et al., 2005). Accordingly, Joskowicz-
Jabloner and Leiser (2011) reported that different betrayal-domains lead to different negative 
emotions and different strategies to relieve these emotions. More specifically, for the social 
norms domain (i.e., trust-betrayal between strangers), emotions of indignation and anger are 
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strongest and financial strategies, such as a financial compensation, reduce these emotions 
most effectively. For the personal domain (i.e., trust-betrayal in an ongoing interpersonal 
relationship), however, emotions of disappointment and hurt are strongest and non-financial 
strategies, such as an apology, reduce these emotions most effectively.  
In the present context, where transgressions occurred in an economic exchange 
situation between strangers (see Desmet et al., 2011; Joskowicz-Jabloner & Leiser, 2011), 
these processes suggest that financial outcomes are likely to have dominated evaluations, 
thereby reducing the impact of apologies in situations where the distributive injustice is 
already redressed (i.e., after equal compensation or overcompensation). The impact of 
apologies may similarly have been reduced when no compensation is given, as in this 
situation  contrary to previous research  the allocator is offering no compensation despite 
being capable of fully compensating the recipient. Therefore, in the present context, an 
apology could even be seen as hypocrisy, because of the apparent contradiction between 
words (expressing regret) and behavior (giving nothing). In sum, these notions suggest that 
relational strategies, like apologies, might have a stronger impact on relationship repair in 
contexts that are less economic, such as in non-financial situations, or in interactions among 
partners or friends in ongoing relationships. Nevertheless, the present findings illustrate that 
even in a strongly financial frame, relational means can contribute to relationship 
preservation. Hence, the present research underlines the importance of relational motives in 
economic situations, and shows that even undercompensation can be persuasive, as long as 
the allocator takes responsibility for unfair behavior by showing remorse. 
4.2 Towards a model of the relative values of financial compensation and apologies 
We were the first to investigate the impact of different compensation sizes and 
apologies on relationship repair simultaneously. Our findings can be captured in a more 
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general model. Because people want equality to be restored they respond positively to equal 
compensation and overcompensation, which implies that the outcome an sich is not the most 
important. This idea is also evident from the study of Loewenstein et al. (1989), who 
demonstrated that the utility that people derive from advantageous inequality is by far 
exceeded by the disutility they derive from disadvantageous inequality.  
In this respect, in the aftermath of distributive harm, the offer of an additional equal 
compensation or overcompensation provides (post-hoc) satisfaction of the equality norm, 
because the compensation readdress the initial state of disadvantageous inequality. Implicitly, 
this means that allocators distance themselves from their previous unfair behavior, by 
eventually conforming to (or exceeding) the applicable standard. This dissociation encourages 
the repair of the damaged or broken relationship. Moreover, there is a positive linear 
relationship between the amount of financial compensation and the level of relationship 
preservation until the level of equal compensation, after which the curve flattens. Thus, once 
equality is reached, an additional action by the transgressor has no additional value in 
promoting the relationship; however, if equality has not been reached (i.e. in cases of 
undercompensation) there is still room to encourage the repair of the broken or damaged 
relationship. For this reason, the impact of relational strategies, such as apologies, will 
especially be pronounced when the point of equality is not yet reached. Stated otherwise, 
undercompensation combined with an apology is considered fairer  and consequently closer 
to the equality norm  than undercompensation without an apology. 
As seen in Figure 1, apologies help to encourage relationship preservation, such that 
the value of a particular amount of resources used as compensation (e.g., ‗x‘, or 50 euro) 
increases up to a higher level of compensation (e.g., ‗x + 1‘, or 70 euro). In other words, in 
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this model, apologies can be expressed in terms of how much monetary value can be saved to 
preserve the relationship (e.g., 20 euro). 
Insert Figure 1 approximately here 
As seen in Figure 2, one possibility is that over the continuum of possible 
undercompensation values, apologies represent a constant which should simply be added to 
the effect of undercompensation (curve a). Another possibility, also depicted in Figure 2, is 
that the power of apologies to preserve a relationship depends on the amount of 
compensation, such that apologies become more effective when the point of equality is 
approached (curve b), or a reversed pattern might even emerge (curve c). 
Insert Figure 2 approximately here 
To test this more general model, further studies should systematically vary the amount 
of extra resources offered by the allocator, which would allow mapping of the relative 
contributions of apologies and compensation in preserving a relationship. Furthermore, the 
added value of an apology to a financial compensation for relationship preservation could 
potentially be influenced by other factors that are involved in relationship repair. Here, we can 
think of potential mediators, such as perceived remorse and perceived admittance (see Barclay 
& Skarlicki, 2008; Scher & Darley, 1997), reaffirmed respect and status of the victim (see 
Barclay & Skarlicki, 2008), forgiveness (see McCullough, 2000; McCullough et al., 1998, 
2006), and trust (see Kramer, 1999; Kramer & Tyler, 1996; Lorenz, 1999; Zaheer & 
Venkatraman, 1995), and potential moderators, like the specific situation (e.g., economic vs. 
non-economic situation; see Desmet et al., 2011), the transgression type (e.g., integrity- vs. 
competence-based trust violation; see Ferrin, Kim, Cooper, & Dirks, 2007; Kim et al., 2004), 
and relationship closeness (e.g., transgressor is a stranger vs. a friend; see Joskowicz-Jabloner 
& Leiser, 2011). 
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4.3 Limitations 
Before closing, some limitations must be discussed. First, both of our studies made use 
of a dictator game. The dictator game has the advantage that the recipient is not able to reject 
the offer, which allowed us to directly assess the separate impacts of financial compensation 
and apologies when the outcomes were identical for each participant (see De Cremer, 2010). 
A downside to this procedure is that real-life situations are often more complex. For example, 
some recipients may enact vengeance or avoid further contact before the allocator has had the 
chance to fix the harm. Moreover, the dictator game is an economic situation, in which 
outcome-related concerns are particularly salient. This means that although our findings 
reveal that particularly strategies that address financial outcomes are effective as means to 
restore relationships, it is possible that relational strategies would be more effective in non-
economic situations. Therefore, while the present studies provide a useful starting point to 
understand the impacts of economic and relational strategies on the repair of relationships, 
future research should examine these strategies in more complex settings (e.g., using the 
ultimatum game) and in more relational contexts (e.g., non-financial decisions and ongoing 
relationships).  
Secondly, to be able to investigate relationship preservation in the aftermath of 
distributive harm, it is important that recipients experience the allocator‘s decision about the 
division of the available resources as a transgression. Previous studies, however, indicate that 
attributing transgressions to clear malicious intent is associated with a decline in forgiveness 
(Boon & Sulsky, 1997) and trust (Desmet et al., 2011). This implies that in our studies there 
could be an effect of perceived intentionality of the transgressor, e.g., in terms of blame 
attribution (see Shaver, 1985). Therefore, further research should take the intentionality of the 
transgression into account. 
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Thirdly, a specific limitation of the pilot study is that we used a within-subjects design, 
which increases the threat of demand characteristics. However, the fact that the lab 
experiment revealed the same pattern of results increases our confidence in the results of the 
pilot study. 
Finally, the exact mechanism through which an apology exerts its positive influence 
on relationship preservation in cases of undercompensation remains unclear in our studies. 
Therefore, a valuable avenue for future research would be to examine the different factors that 
can explain the added value of an apology in addition to financial undercompensation for 
relationship repair. 
4.4 Conclusions 
The present studies show that when financial harm has been inflicted in an economic 
context, financial strategies (i.e., financial compensation) and relational strategies (i.e., 
apologies) play roles in preserving relationships. More specifically, apologies encourage the 
preservation of the relationship after an unfair resource allocation followed by an offer of 
financial compensation that is too low to satisfy the equality norm. 
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Figure Captions 
Figure 1. The relationship between the amount of compensation and relationship preservation. 
Note. The solid line indicates financial compensation and the dashed line indicates the 
additional value of an apology. 
Figure 2. Three possibilities for the additional value of an apology on relationship 
preservation.  
Note. The solid line indicates financial compensation and the dashed lines indicate the 
additional value of apologies: the dashed line and square indicate curve a; the dashed line and 
circle indicate curve b; the dashed line and triangle indicate curve c. 
Table 1 
The number and percentage of participants that would (or would not) give the allocator a 
second chance in the next round in study 1 (N = 21) 
Allocator’s response Give the allocator a second chance? 
 Yes No 
 n % n % 
Undercompensation 6 28.6 15 71.4 
Undercompensation with an apology 10 47.6 11 52.4 
Equal compensation 20 95.2 1 4.8 
Overcompensation 16 76.2 5 23.8 
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Table 2 
Means, standard deviations, and the number of cases for each condition in study 2 (N = 247) 
Dependent variable Compensation condition Apology condition 
  No apology Apology Total 
  M SD n M SD n M SD n 
Relationship preservation No compensation 2.66 1.00 39 2.70 1.10 33 2.68 1.04 72 
 Undercompensation 3.22 1.07 29 3.73 0.73 30 3.48 0.94 59 
 Equal compensation 4.40 0.73 29 4.19 0.84 30 4.29 0.79 59 
 Overcompensation 4.43 0.90 32 3.99 1.22 25 4.24 1.06 57 
 Total 3.62 1.22 129 3.61 1.14 118 3.61 1.18 247 
Note. Higher mean scores indicate greater intentions to preserve the relationship.  
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